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Kenya is currently in the midst of a land tenure and •; 
organizational revolution affecting in particular the arrange-
ments for economic life in Masailand. The basis of the revo-
lution is a land adjudication program which: is turning 
tribal lands from common property into private property t o -
be held by individuals or groups. All members of,-the tribe 
possessing traditional claims are able to receive land. 
Equally important is a body.of new legislation which enables 
group owners to.organize into a corporate body possessing 
the legal powers, to accept loans and eonduct a business 
enterprise. In one fell swoop the government is hopefully 
creating a set of institutions to facilitate - the economic.. _ ; • 
development of pastoral people such as the Masai without • ~ 
at the same time incurring the severe social costs of up-, 
rooting and.rendering landless large numbers of people. 
There are rationales for the program as seen from a „.: 
number of vantage points. Eirst there is the economic 
rationale-which emphasizes the low ftrder of productivity of 
most of Kenya's, rangeland under pastoral ferns of subsistence 
livestock management. The policy of maximizing the nation's 
economic growth requires that the.pastoral rangelands be 
brought into-commercial production, j-f.Source 8 and 9)> 
Then there is the ecological or resource conservation 
viewpoint which emphasizes the gradual deterioration of the 
rangelands under present forms of common property ownership 
and the increasing human populations' which require increasing 
livestock numbefs for'subsistence. ' The strategy of mini-
mizing losses incurred from Increasingly frequent and severe 
famines among the pastoralists requires that remedial measures 
be taken which will keep livestock numbers-within some • 
semblance of' carrying capacities and at the same time provide 
an adequate standard of living for the people, (Source 10):. 
Given that there must be change,- and this is documented 
in a number'of reports cited among the'sources, then there 
is a humanistic rationale for the 'program being' adopted in that 
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while group ownership makes property rights definite and there-
by clears the way for commercial activities; the composition 
and organization of the groups may retain sufficient reference 
to traditional associations and authority structures that cha-
nge will not "be allowed to come with a violent wrench. 
""'Before going into some of the problems which may be 
encountered by the development project its dimensions and 
underpinnings will be briefly described and some background 
understanding developed. 
The essence of the land adjudication program is that 
tribal lands, wnich under the colonial government in Kenya 
wpre administered by'the government and which, since indepen-
dence have been held in trust as "trust lands" by the County 
Councils, will be assigned through a survey and review process 
to their customary users. Customary*use is determined by an 
adjudication team which submits its findings to an adjudication 
committee appointed for each section being adjudicated. 
Appropriate review and arbitration procedures are provided in 
the act. (Source 1) 
The adjudication program"for the rangelands for the 1970-
1974 period is fairly ambitous, a total of 5,105,000 hectares 
to be registered by June 30, 1974. (Source 9 p 282, table 8.1). 
This is about 10% of the total rangeland area of Kenya but the 
4,079?000 hectares to be adjudicated' In Narok and Kajiado dist-
ricts comprise 100 percent of those districts. 
Estimates of ;the economic significance of the adjudica-
tion program are related to one's theories about property rights. 
There are two propositions here. One is that under the regime 
of common;property no one has any incentive to take an interest 
in the long term condition of the. rangeland because any such 
action would amount to an investment, the returns from which 
could not be captured with any assurance. Thus, under common : 
property conditions it is to everyone's-individual interest 
to use.fully-or/to overuse- the current output of the .range. 
By assigning definite property rights to specific individuals 
or groups the consequences -.of misuse and the returns to 
investment in future productivity are both made specific to. the 
holders of those property rights. 
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It is possible, of course, for government to take .over 
a common property -resource and manage it in the interests of 
the community or society. This too would correct the short-
comings of common property ownership. That private ownership 
has been opted for in the case of Kenya's rangelands may 
reflect the political realities of the tribal lands question 
and it may also indicate the conviction by the leadership 
in Kenya that the incentives and opportunities of private 
property offer a crucial requirement for economic progress. 
This is the second proposition. On both counts the program 
is obviously rooted in individualistic theories of property 
rights. 
The Concept of Group Ranches; 
In the Kaputiei area of Kajiado District where group' 
ranching is getting under way 14 group- ranches are being 
set up in an area of 664,000 acres. One hundred families 
on the average will occupy 47,500 acres per -ranch* The 
intention is that group affiliations which were Identified 
in surveys carried *ut several years ago will be preserved 
in the adjudication which establishes group ranches. Since 
the Kaputiei- Masai are semi nomadic this means rthat their 
customary wet season and dry season grazing areas are 
ideally to be included-in the ranch assigned to each group. 
How well social and ecological balances have been served 
by land adjudication remains to be seen. 
In order to receive government loans a group must 
organize and register itself with the registrar of' group 
representatives. The process of organization consists of 
electing a slate of group representatives (not less than 
three nor more than ten), adopting a constitution, and elec-
ting a group committee. A legally constituted group can, 
through its group representatives,--"-behave as a corporate 
body. That is, it can hold'property, acquire debts, sue 
and be sued etc. (Such a group does not, however, come 
under the corporation laws of Kenya. The advantages of 
having a separate-act for group ranches" are claimed to be 
legal simplicity, lower costs and- lower tax rates). 
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The committee is the functioning managerial body for 
the group, Among: other things, it assists and.encourages 
members to f ollow good technical and commercial practices, 
raises credit and holds and uses moneys in benefit of the 
members, may effect purchase or sale of stock or other assets 
in behalf of members, may levy a cess or charges in respect 
of the services it performs, and is the decision making 
authority regarding the rights and obligations of any 
person in matters relating to the use of group land and 
other assets (subject to appeals). 
Thus we find two layers of authority in the leadership 
structure of a group ranch. The group representatives occupy 
a custodial or trusteeship role whereas the committee dischar-
ges day to day management responsibilities.. Both groups occupy 
an elected position but whereas Committee Members are elected 
annually, group representatives serve until they are. removed, 
either voluntarily or involuntarily. Although the committee 
makes decisions affecting operations the group representatives 
"may issue instructions to the committee or to any member in 
any case in which in their opinion, such instructions are. 
in the best interests of the group." The group representatives 
appear in the role of a council of elders which resolves dis-
putes and takes a hand in matters which are not being satis-
factorily handled by .the operating committee. It may well 
be, as one government official suggests, that the group., 
representatives will be the. guardians of traditional ways 
and the buffers against radical change. The committee, 
on the other hand, may represent a progressive spirit as 
embodied in one or two progressive committee members. Under 
such circumstances the division of power between committee 
and group representatives may be. crucial to the economic 
success of a ranch. 
Although the. land., is held in common and undivided .ownership 
by all members of the group, pertain property rights .are 
assigned to the individuals and certain rights are retained 
by the group as a corporate body. For example, residence 
rights are given to each member-, of the group (there are 
limits which can be placed on.the relatives- and friends who 
may wish to reside with members), but the group committee has 
control over the rights of grazing, tillage and water. 
The rights to sale of property can only ""be excercised by the 
group representatives with the approval of government (the" 
Registrar of Group Representatives.) (Source 1, the Land-
Group Representatives - Act of vl.9'68 ). . ... 
This control, of property rights.: has substantial economic 
implications for the- operation of the group enterprise. The 
group has control of the means of production, grazing,water 
and tillage, and may establish mechanisms for the allocation 
of the means of production which can be as efficient 
economically as they desire. At the same time no, member 
is disenfranchised from his right to reside in the land nor 
of his elaim to some share of ownership in the enterprise. 
. vi *..-. • . •.'.»• 
• Aside: from .the advantage of allocating land in economic 
units without creating a landless class, the. group ranch 
innovation undoubtedly provides a means for capturing 
economies of scale in. the provision of water/, in buying 
and. selling livestock, and in grazing and health practices. 
Such advantages might elude the individual owners of neces-
sarily far smaller tracts. Whether the tracts are big 
enough to provide a .substantial measure of risk pooling 
against drouth cannot be determined as yet. Studies of 
strategies for coping with drou^H would probably reveal 
that the common property conventions -of present Masai 
grazing practices which virtually permit individual access 
to all of the tribal lands and waters during times of 
stress provide" highly advantagous means for coping with 
drou^lT'in a system where markets for sale and repurchase 
are highly imperfect and where the prime goal of management 
is survival of the herd. Were, the problem analyzed in a 
system where the goal of 'management was production and where 
far better markets for .sale' and repurchase were available 
the conclusion might be that far less freedom to roam would 
be necessary during-drou^-"* times. ' Whether it would be . 
optimal for the ranches as presently laid out to keep 
to their boundaries during severe drouths is far from 
clear. Since"European ranches in the same area move cattle 
from ranch to ranch to. take advantage of local variability 
in rainfall and forage production, a similar practice among 
the group ranches' may prove beneficial. 
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Some Specific Issues in the Organization and Operation of 
Group Ranches;' 
The division of.power between the Committee and the 
Group representatives and the.extent to which the Committee 
ean coordinate individual actions in the sphere of livestock 
production become major themes in an inquiry into the 
organization and functioning of group ranches. Probably 
the key area, in which this theme will be played concerns 
eontrol over grazing rights. Although the' land is valuable 
for residence and tillage, its chief economic product is 
grazing. (Water, of course, is a necessary appurtenance to 
grazing but its allocation within the ranch will not be 
subject to the same stringencies of scarcity as grazing). -
The Committee will have two functions with regard . to 
grazing rights. One will be to enforce the carrying capaci-
ties for the ranch which have been agreed upon in consultation . 
with the District Range Officer and which may be revised from 
time to time. The second will be to allocate, or to set up' 
a mechanism ft3r allocating grazing rights to individual members 
of the group. 
If the government 'is successful in getting the Masai 
to accept and enforce limits on the number of cattle to be . 
carried for a given period on their ranches it will have 
achieved a long standing aim of range management policy. 
Excessive numbers of cattle on the range' have long been a 
problem created by the Masai policy of acquiring large 
individual herds and the common property character of the 
rangeland which gave no one individual an incentive to 
conserve on the usen of the rangeland. Assigning individual 
rights to specific group ranch properties should give the. 
group, but not the individual, an incentive to find the. opti-
mum conservation policy for its ranch- land. The individual 
will still need some forms" of persuasion not to be found in 
the fact of property ownership if. he.is to observe fixed limits 
on grazing rights. The pressures of security, and prestige 
which produced large herd build-ups should abate as- the 
subsistence economy is replaced by the cash economy and as, 
the values of commercial livestock husbandry replace tradi-
tional livestock values. The emergence of commercial values' 
will mean that rapid turnover of quality herds will•replace•• 
large herds of low quality and low turnover. 
The crucial question is how long it will take the ranch 
committees' to accept the desirability of putting limits on the 
numbers of livestock to'be. carried on their ranches. Since 
the dry season limitation of available water will no longer 
exist, once water.supplies are in, the results of too long 
a delay in acceptance of livestock controls could be a rapid 
and widespread'deterioration of the range. Ecologists like 
to point out that the precedent for this deterioration can 
be seen today along the pipeline road from Sultan Hamud to 
Loitokitok. 
If a ranch committee refuses to accept a responsibility 
for ..limiting livestock numbers then it faces no problem of 
distributing grazing rights to individual members. Each can 
have as much as he "likes and all will share proportionately 
in the periodic disasters which will follow. If a committee 
accepts a responsibility for limiting total livestock numbers 
on their ranch then they immediately face the second problem 
of how to distribute the limited grazing capacity of the ranch 
among the members. This will probably be the first time in 
Masai history that such a course of action has been necessary. O Ci 
In their traditions all within a section share as need be in 
the grazing and water available in the section. If other 
sections are in need of grazing they are permitted to enter 
the territory of adjoining sections in search of grazing and 
by proper application would be entitled to use the waterholes. 
This set of reciprocal privileges has kept the condition of 
common property in rangeland alive across all of Masailand. 
We need not dwell on the importance of the allocation 
issue. If grazing rights are not allocated to the stockmen Who 
can make the most profit with them, then neither the ranch 
interests, the interests of the lending agency nor the inter-
ests of the national economy will be best served. On the 
other hand, if a handful of individuals monopolize the grazing 
quota, some will feel that the'interests of equity and fair-
•'•'"••"• . • -• • * a,Hd '2*0ells 
ness are'not being served. The means^/ohosen for the alloca-
tion of grazing rights will therefore be one of the crucial 
first steps taken by the committee. 
There are two broad alternative systems for allocating 
grazing rights - one' is an administrative system, the other 
a market system, An administrative system would prohibit 
exchange of grazing quotas without approval of the committee. 
The committee'would "be expected to periodically revise the 
allocation of quotas and at such times would be caught between 
those who want egalitarian distribution of wealth and those 
who favor upholding the initially unequal distribution of 
cattle and grazing rights. Sut in theory, at least, the 
group would have control over the distribution of the essen-
tial economic privilege of grazing. Whether there is any pros 
pect of a committee being able to withstand this push and pull 
of opposing interests in making and enforcing such administra-
tive decisions will be referred to again. 
A market system for allocating grazing rights could 
work continuously in that any two members could agree on a 
transfer of grazing rights for whatever consideration was 
mutually acceptable and there could also be periodic trading 
days arranged, say at annual meetings, where these wanting 
to acquire grazing quotas could bid competitively for the 
available supply. The principal restriction on such transac-
tions need only be that they be limited to the lifetime of 
the seller since any transaction extending beyond a lifetime 
would be a sale or disposal of land in contravention of the 
law. 
The government has proposed a set of rules for group 
ranches which are broad enough to permit a group to choose 
either option for the allocation of grazing quotas. On the 
one hand members shall graze stock in accordance with the 
grazing quota "from time to time allocated to him" but the 
rules also clearly state that members shall be entitled to 
permit any other member of the group to use the whole or part 
of his grazing quota and a member may transfer his quota, to 
any other member of the group. It is quite clear that the 
committee cannot have it both ways. A market system of 
allocation will not work if it is to be periodically overruled 
by arbitrary decisions. 
A somewhat less convincing but still substantial view-
point would hold that no committee ..will be strong enough to 
withstand the pressures on it if it chose to allocate and 
reallocate grazing rights on some basis of fairness or 
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equity or unfairness and inequity. Neither would please 
everyone and the resulting dissatisfaction might be fatal 
to the whole Concept of a group ranch. 'Only if one can 
foresee highly authoritarian powers excercised by a committee 
and backed by an authoritarian government can one really 
conceive of the administrative allocation system as being 
workable. 
The theoretical case for a market system of grazing 
quota allocation is quite simple. By allowing grazing quotas 
to go to the highest bidder (after some initial allocation 
is agreed upon) the system assures that those who can make the 
most money out of Cattle will control the grazing and this 
in turn will assure the ranch of higher aggregate profits 
than any other allocation. But of course the profits may 
be very unequally distributed, depending upon who owns the 
ultimate grazing rights. If one wanted to make the most 
money for a ranch and at the same time redistribute a share-
of the profits he would advocate an equal initial (and there-
fore inalienable) distribution of grazing rights with free 
exchange by leasing or rentals subsequently. Rental value 
would be based on bhe market's assessment of the profitability 
of a grazing share and rental values Would be shared equally 
among all members, thus assuring that'; a share of the profits 
i.e. rents are equally distributed. 
A problem stemming from the separation of ownership 
and use of grazing quotas concerns the allocation of charges 
to members. If ownership and use were identical then 
allocation of investment costs, "costs of supplies and 
materials to operate dips and boreholes and the like could 
be done according to grazing quota ownership or grazing quota 
use with no difference in'the results. If ownership and use 
is separate and the committee attempts to allocate all 
investment and operating costs according to use' of grazing 
quotas, then sooner or later a' user is'going to object 
to paying the investment costs for an owner who, he will 
claim, is benefiting from investment in fixed assets at 
his, the user's, expense. At first hearing this sounds 
like the classic landlord-tenant problem In"a nfew setting 
but the essential element of uhcertainty of tenure will be 
missing if grazing quotas are leased on a long term basis. 
Or even with short term leases the fact of irrevocable member-
ship gives, a user a degree of certainty of tenure in the 
enterprise that is missing in the usual tenure problem. 
Another possible mitigation of the problem, comes in the 
possibility that the committee will act as the head of a 
firm in making its investment decisions. In doing so it will 
compare marginal costs and benefits without regard to distri-
butional issues and will reach a correct result. Typical 
landlord—tenant problems arise because each is looking at a 
different net vrevenue function. 
Nevertheless, the issue remaining between owners and 
users will continue to be one of distribution of profits. 
The organization of a market for grazing quotas will solve 
this in part but since the allocation of certain common 
costs will be somewhat arbitrary, the issue, will remain. 
Under a strong committee, however, it need not affect economic 
decisions. The government will need to take some pains to get 
its thoughts straight on this issue. 
An interesting solution to the allocation issue may be 
that instead of.exchanging grazing quotas members will exchange 
cattle in order to fully use grazing quotas. This solution 
will depend in part on whether individuals would prefer to 
give up control of their cattle or their grazing rights. 
Also, this will not be an optimal solution to the allocations 
if there & r e substantial differences in the abilities of 
different stockmen. For a good stockman to give up part 
of his herd to the control of an inferior stockman would be 
far less productive than for the inferior stockman to give 
up part of his grazing quota to the superior stockman. 
One can- see a force working in favour of grazing rights 
exchange and opposed to cattle exchange.- That will be the 
assessments for meeting principal.and interest payments and 
for paying operating costs.. The individuals with the least 
ability or inclination to operate commercially successful 
herds will find, it difficult or impossible to carry their 
share-proportionate to their .share of grazing rights -
of the cash costs. ,. The easiest way for them to handle their 
obligation — if .default is. not .tolerated - will be for them 
to find someone else who is willing to take over their grazing 
rights and with them their share of- the payments. 
_ J_J_ _ 
Although not prevented by laws and,regulations from 
owning cattle, government's present•intentions are that the . 
group committee will serve only as the agent for buying and 
selling cattle. and as the financial agent for securing and 
repaying loans. Individuals will own all cattle and loans 
arranged by the committee may be secured by the pledge of 
individual chattels. An interesting communal development has 
occurred on the one group ranch which is currently in 
operation. This concerns the fact that steers purchased 
for individuals have been'held in a common herd under the man-
agement of the committee. This is significant because, if 
one accepts that some of the more progressive members are 
likely to be committeemen and particularly if the manager 
is competent,, then management by the committee is likely 
to be of a .higher order of proficiency than management in 
the aggregate. It might•therefore be desirable to see a 
committee gradually enlarge its management sphere until 
most of the commercial cattle herd on a ranch is under the 
direct management of -the committee and its hired managers 
and herdsmen. This would. give the committee direct control 
of calf management, -of livestock health, of grazing:prac-
tice of culling and :other:essential management techniques 
which Can be introduced.only slowly in individual herds. 
It probably provides the most.direct means- the group ranch, 
has of harnes-sing the. drive of the more progressive for. the 
benefit of the entire organization. . •:• ,:. , 
It may be noted.here that some very large issues 
surround the. nature of the decision-making and.; authority 
structure which will emerge, in the group ranches. First, 
there is an ambiguity regarding the•affinities of the 
groups which nave been identified.. The government believes 
that the elatia associations it has identified are ranch-
wideband therefore provider some initial cohesion. Our 
persistent inquiries in the. field into the. meaning of the 
term have elicited one unvarying response s on elatia... is a 
bomai This does, not mean.there are no affinities among 
bomas but it does, suggest that there may be.some misunder-
standings. -about them, .-vo • - ,r-. .•.- -.• .;-,. • 
In fact,Jacobs .-(Source. 17) has defined affinity groups 
which are associated with ecological land.units and which 
possess some internal authority structures. We are not in 
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a position at this point to say that the groups identified in 
Kaputiei are or are not affinity groups. The fact that some 
ranches are almost wholly wet season grazing (Source 11) 
and that our field inquiries* have discovered that some families 
have elected to change their affinities at the time the groups 
are registered makes us want to inquire further into the 
ecological and sociological integrity of the ranches as 
adjudicated. 
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, if a traditional 
authority structure does exist within the group, it will have 
"been used to settle legal disputes and not as an instrument 
of resource management. The two are not the same, resource 
management having been in individualistic matter. Will 
traditional authority structures have any useful carryover 
to the problems of estate management and commercial ranching? 
Aside from the hope that.progress will come through the 
efforts of the group committee, either because of the persua-
sion and demonstration effects of the progressive members who, 
it is hoped, will dominate -the committee or because Of the 
fact that authority for decision and action will be taken" 
over by the committee, there are some economies of scale which' 
can be captured by the group ranches. The first economy of 
scale concerns the provision of permanent water. The costs of 
a borehole are mainly due to depth rather than yield and the 
depth is determined by geological conditions rather than the 
amount of water desired. There are therefore, large fixed 
costs in the provision of boreholes which make it economical 
for a sharing of Water as widely as possible." The government 
is proposing that on the individual ranches in Kajiado Dist-
rict, there be a sharing of boreholes among about three 
ranches, but unlike the group ranches in common ownership, the 
individuals will have to work out rules of access which permit-
ranchers to enter the property of another for water. The* : 
costs of pumping wa,ter also show decreasing average costs 
up t« a point. The advantages of sharing cattle dips on 
group ranches rest on similar facts of large initial fixed 
costs and a declining average cost curve over some range. 
We badly need more information on the economics of forage 
utilization and the relationship between size of ranching 
unit and the costs of dealing with drouth but we can be quite 
- 13 -
sure that (1). group ranches offer an opportunity to avoid 
the considerable social diseconomies inherent in the 
traditional common property ownership of the range, if 
grazing capacities and rotation plans are enforced, and 
(2) group ranches provide some advantages in coping with 
drouth which are not found on smaller; scale units. 
A Background Note on the Institution of Group Ranching; 
In characterizing the institution of group ranching 
one needs to be aware of certain precedents. Group farming 
is found in sugar and cotton production in Nyanza in Western 
Kenya where it has arisen spontaneously as a matter of self 
help. In the jokakwaro land and labor are pooled to secure 
advantages of cooperation during peak labor periods and 
larg« scale machinery operations in certain stages of 
production. (Sources4, 12). 
In the Northern Plains states of the U.S. grazing 
associations lease land which is. placed under group manage-
ment. The associations pay leasing charges, collect grazing 
fees and other assessments to cover expenses and distribute 
any profits among members. The associations achieve a pri-
vate economic advantage from the large scale coordination of 
grazing and a social advantage by internalizing the costs 
and benefits of soil and water conservation (Source 13, p.34). 
The Israeli kvutzas and Tanzania1 s u.jamaa villages 
provide the best known examples of cooperative farming 
for comparison with group ranches. Pragmatic considerations 
of scale economies and financial advantages of bigness 
provide an economic rationale for these examples of coopera-
tive farming. (Source 14). Group ranching, however has 
developed without any of the ideological accompaniment of 
these more famous examples of cooperation. (Source 15). 
Group ranching, one may reasonably conclude, is a pragmatic 
rather than ideological solution to a complex set of issues 
which have existed in .Masailand for long time. 
Pirst., "sere. is the issue of progress and development. 
The Lawranee Commission, whose report presents an early 
recording of the .idea of group ranching for Masailand, 
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refers to a document entitled "A Plan for the Development of 
Kenya Masailand," in which the authors, a group of Masai and 
government officers stated "The Masai now wish to progressi-
vely give up their-nomadic way of life and to settle down to-
a static existence". (Source .4). While one may cavil at the 
credentials of the spokesmen, one cannot deny that the state-
ment recognizes certain inescapable conclusions about the 
traditional Masai way of life. 
Above all, this brings the land question into focus. 
Against a background of the inevitability of providing secure 
land titles to the Masai the Lawrance Commission showed 
evident concern that secure title and static existence 
meant to many Masai a settling down on individual plots of r< 
land. The Commission v/as convinced that Masai leaders did 
not appreciate the twin dangers of creating subeconomic 
units and a large class of landless people, 'both being' 
inherent in individualization of the rangeland. 
The East African Royal Commission, which had gone into 
the land question intensively, discusses individual regi3-
tration as the only alternative to unregistered tenure, 
although the Commission does recognize ah urgent need to 
find alternatives to the migratory behaviour and common 
pasturage of the pastoral peoples' in general. (Source. 5). 
Thus, one can pinpoint with sufficient exactitude for our 
purposes the birthdate of the group ranching concept as 
falling in the decade between the Royal Commission (1955) 
and lawrance Commission (1965) reports. 
A further set of problems -the ecological problems of 
the rangeland - have also been an obvious stimulus to innova-
tion. The theme of compression and. restricted movements 
forced upon the pastoralist by government policies and the 
consequent overgrazing and decline in range productivity 
•J • r , • • 
recurs continuously in reports on East African rangeland 
' f-y ": • : ; . ': 
conditions. At the time of the'.Royal Commission there was 
growing realization that destocking and herd controls were 
by themselves insufficient and unacceptable palliatives for 
the declining conditions of the land and in fact were 'incon-
sistent with the pastoral way of life. The Royal Commission 
concluded that the main need of the pastoralist is "to find 
some satisfactory alternative to the old migratory invasion 
which will."bring to. his aid some system of economic usage 
which will save his land.i;. (Source 5 p. 283). 
Conversations with some of the key persons in govern-
ment at the time the land adjudication and group representa-
tives legislation was formulated, have produced a number of 
insights concerning the .'philosophy and intent of the legis-
lation. (P.M. Charnley, L.S. Sherif, S.J. Meadows).--' 
In sum, it was intended that the pastoralists, the 
Masai in particular, should have a system- of documentation 
which would enable them to operate commercial enterprises 
on their lands but that they should be protected against 
rapid'"change Which might upset" traditions, create large ' 
numbers of landless people,and transform land into on economic 
good subject to, free buying and selling but also.that they 
should be offered 'simpler instruments than the Companies 
Act for carrying out this transformation. Another theme 
found in-the explanation of. the legislation is that it 
provides an evolutionary or transitional, mode of change 
* 
based as far as possible on the traditional ways. The 
outcome of the transition presumably is a more highly 
commercialized and. individualized livestock, operation but\ 
this raally cannot be foreseen clearly since it. is something 
to be worked out within the framework set by the legislation. 
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SUPPLEMENT TO DISCUSSION PAPER No. 93 
NOTES ON PROJECTED RETURNS TO 
GROUP RANCHING 
Projections have "been -worked oat for 16 group ranches in Kaputiei 
section, Kajiado District. The projections, done by the UNDP/FAO survey 
team, are "based on investments in dips and water facilities , a gradual 
improvement in the livestock production coefficients ana a m.jor steer 
purchase and fattening programme. The projections make a number of 
assumptions which could usefully "be subjected to sensitivity analysis. 
Some assumptions regarding relative price increases may be unwarranted. 
Nevertheless, taking projections at face value one can reach some 
conclusions about incremental returns to cattle ranching in this section 
of Kajiado District. 
The net benefit calculations have been redone by us in order to 
correct for an error in accounting (see earlier note on discounting 
involving working capital) and discounted at 15$ rate of interest. Of the 
16 ranches only 10 have positive net benefits at this rate of discount„ 
The present value of net benefits for the 10 ranches comprising 4713300 
acres comes to £117,300. This can be taken as a residual social value 
which can be imputed as a return to land and/or the initial herd, and/or 
management. Although arbitrary, the 15 percent discount rate certainly 
is near the social opportunity cost of capital. It is also the cut off 
rate AEC intends to use in evaluating projects„ As a residual imputed 
to the land the net present value turns out to be shs,4*71 per acre0 In 
other words the incremental economic benefits increase the value of the 
land by shs.4.71 per acre. This is equivalent to 0/70 per acre per year 
in perpetuity at 15 percent „ 
We may compare this with the present economic situation, as best 
it can be pieced together. Working with totals for the entire Kaputiei 
section we find that the estimated milk and meat consumed from the 
livestock in the section is worth shs„1.60 per acre? the imputed value 
of cattle products being shs.1.34® To this must be added the reported 
cattle income of shs-1,-30 per acre from sales for a total cattle income of 
shs.2.64 per acre and a total cash and imputed livestock income of shs,2o87 
per acre per annum. (This neglects incomes from stock trading and off-
ranch labour). The 10 ranches we are discussing receive a current cash 
yield from their herds of 6.3 per cent of initial herd value and an 
imputed cattle income of 6,5 per cent of initial herd value making a 
total return of 12.8 per cent on initial herd value. (We have neglected 
to include net annual change in herd value)® We achieve equivalence in 
current and project cash income estimates by computing the present value 
of a 12 year stream of present cash incomes plus the discounted value 
of the cattle herd at year 12, assuming no change in herd value. The 
present value of current income streams is shs.4,514,300/= or shs.9.57 per 
acre. The projected increment of shs.4.71 per acre means that in terms 
of primary national monetary income "benefits, these ten ranches are 
increasing their productivity "by 50 per cent. 
In terms of monetary and subsistence benefits the development 
project increases total incomes by only 28 percent, assuming that 
subsistence incomes remain unchanged,, The discounted value of 
current cash and non cash incomes is shs.l6.9O per acre at 15 percent 
interest. In all likelihood milk supplies could increase because 
of more frequent waterings, better grazing practices and improved 
genetic traits- This could mean more milk for calves at no cost to 
human consumption. Meat available from natural mortality should 
decrease. At present this source makes up about one third of the 
imputed incomes. There is no allwancc in the projections for increased 
home slaughter of cattle so that if natural mortality drops by 50 
per cent as projected this will be a net loss of shs.150,000 per annum 
in current home consumption which has been ignored in the comparisons,, 
Including this loss drops the increase in total incomes to 19 per cent. 
Social and Private Returns 
One can expect a divergence between social and private viewpoints 
on the valuation of returns to a project such as this one. The divergences 
occur on both tangible and intangible issues. He are concerned.here 
primarily with the tangible issues of definition of net returns, and 
choice of a discount rate. 
It may be argued that from the viewpoint of the ranchers the 
financial cash flow, after payment of interest and principle on loans, 
is a more appropriate measure of returns than are the net benefits 
defined without consideration of financial costs. This may be especially 
so since the social rate of discount used (15%) Is higher than the rate 
of interest charged to the ranchers (7<>5• 
A further matter concerns the possibility of a divergence between 
the social rate of time preference and the rate of time preference of the 
group under consideration. Although the usual pattern in agriculture is 
to find private disc<?unt rates to be higher than social discount rates due 
to capital rationing, it appears possible that the Macai in this.case 
nay have a lower rate of time preference than society as a whole, or at 
least not a higher one. 
Although this conclusion is based on an arbitrarily selected, 
value for the social discount rate and on the somewhat imperfect estimate 
of currcnt returns to liquid capital, the possibility that the Masai have 
a lower discount rate than the Kenya society as a whole appeals to casual 
judgement. They are a relatively well off people by comparison with 
most other peoples in Kenya and therefore can tolerate a lower return on 
their capital assets. They also have a traditionally high propensity to 
save as expressed in their preference for accumulating wealth in the 
form of cattle. Whether this is attributable to strategies for coping 
with drouth or to traditional value systems, it means a greater 
willingness to forego present consumption than may be found in the 
society as a whole. The 12 percent rate of return we have estimated for 
their present cattle herds may therefore be used as an estimate of their 
rate of time preference. 
Thus, we may discuss private returns on the basis of financial cash 
flows discounted at 12 percent rather than net primary benefits discounted 
at 15 percent. From this viewpoint the ranching project increases the 
productivity of the land resources by 35 percent if only cash values are 
considered and by 24 percent if both cash and imputed values are considered. 
From the private viewpoint the increases in productivity attributable 
to the development project are somewhat less than they appear to be from 
the public or social viewpoint. If development imposes many significant 
intangible costs such as diminution in enjoyment from day to day 
association with cattle, interference with some of the traditional social 
and ceremonial uses of cattle, or general intereference with individual 
freedoms these could well offset the 4- to •§• gain in measurable incomes 
which development promises to the Masai. 
The major issue which seems to come from this analysis is whether 
the government's planners cannot devise projects which offer far greater 
gains to the Masai than these initial plans appear to offer. 
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